



Shelter Cluster NWSW Cameroon

ShelterCluster.org

Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter

Northwest and Southwest Regional Crisis in Cameroon Contingency Plan

Estimated Resources Required to
Respond to High Impact Emergencies

\$500,000

6000 People

1000 HH

Estimated Resources Required
to Respond to Disastrous Impact
Emergencies

\$1.1 Million

15,600 People

2600 HH


**Funding needed for
Preparedness Activities**
\$340,000 for reinforcing
preparedness stock
\$100,000 for preparatory
assessments

Name of Response	Internal Displacement and Damage to Shelters Response in the Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon
Cluster Lead Agency	UNHCR
Cluster Coordinator Contact	Renee Wynveen, wynveen@unhcr.org
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Shelter Cluster Partners with operational funds reported in the 5W	AMEF, AWA, Caritas, CRS, DRC, H4BF, HURAC, IOM, Intersos, IRC, PUI, NRC, Rhema Care, SHUMAS, SIRDEP, UNHCR
Shelter Cluster Meeting on discussion on contingency planning: 21st July 2023	https://sheltercluster.org/north-west-south-west/news/21st-july-shelter-cluster-meeting-minutes

Operational Context

Armed Clashes and Violence Against Civilians

Source ACLED Data download July 10,2023





Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest Regions are two of the most natural resource abundant of the country. The two regions are also home to a number of English-speaking citizens who have long felt marginalized and under-represented in Cameroon's central government. Some of the communities, due to distance and lack of suitable roads, have been more easily able to conduct their business in Nigeria rather than in Cameroon. This lack of representation, the lack of investment in infrastructure improvements, lack of ability to easily update civil documentation, and poor education and healthcare services resulted in lawyers and teachers peacefully protesting in 2017. These peaceful protests descended into violence as several groups sought to take advantage of these protest movements to start a secessionist movement to put in place the "State of Ambazonia" which is a political claim that is based on a historical demarcation of the Northwest and Southwest regions as the Southern Cameroons. This demarcation was done following World War II when Germany lost its territorial colonies and they were divided between the British and the French prior to the establishment of the country of Cameroon.

Since 2017, both the Non-State Armed Groups (NSAG) (those wishing to declare independence) and the Government Defense Forces of Cameroon have engaged in a number of battles, armed attacks, and violence against civilians which has resulted in the displacement of several hundred thousand persons over the last six years. The NSAG forces have splintered as they have continued to lose resources in the Diaspora. This has resulted in a loss of organization and a lack of clear political unity and an increasingly difficult operating environment in the field as different non-state armed groups claim to control different small geographical sections of the Northwest and Southwest regions in addition to the denial of government forces that any territory is held by the NSAG forces.

In addition to the elements of the crisis, the Northwest and Southwest Region's resource abundance makes it vulnerable to a series of natural disasters especially as climate change continues to strengthen the impact of weather events on the locations where the population is residing. These natural disaster risks include flooding, landslides, volcanic activity, and wildfires among other natural phenomena.


Response Capacity



Entering into its fifth year of the Shelter Cluster activation in the Northwest and Southwest regions and sixth year of the conflict, IDPs are protracted in their displacement, returnees are coming back to find shelters damaged, while recurrent emergencies are still common. Despite having 16 operational partners, the Shelter Cluster is only on track to reach the needs of 70,000 people this year which would be only 24% of its annual target had all funding been received. Since its activation, when the Shelter Cluster partners received \$2 million dollars in funding for its first 2 months of implementation, the Shelter Cluster in the Northwest and Southwest has wavered between an average annual funding of \$1.1 to 1.6 million dollars. The decline in funding is not linear due to the fact that some national NGOs self-fund some limited activities and the inability to estimate individual agency changes in staffing. Not only is the Cluster underfunded, but a number of partners are lacking the appropriate human resources to absorb and implement funding in the area of humanitarian shelter which is exacerbated by the current dynamics of the crisis.

Beyond challenges with funding and human resources, Shelter Cluster partners are also confronted with many access issues in addition to limited days to be able to be in the field to implement good shelter programming. Firstly, the splintering of Non-State Armed Groups has resulted in a number of road blocks and checkpoints throughout the two regions which make humanitarian access difficult. The map on the left represents the type of access that Shelter Cluster partners have throughout the regions. The West and Littoral Regions are hosting regions and are not impacted by the elements of the crisis. The map is representing only reported limitations that partners have with security-related roadblocks. In addition to security-related lack of access is the fact that the rainy season also exacerbates the conditions of the roads complicating the delivery of items and making some roads impassable.

Most partners that are distributing emergency kits store these items in Douala, from which they have to deliver them to various field locations throughout the Northwest and Southwest. Douala is a one day drive from Bamenda, and less than 2 hours from Buea. When requesting items, the



transportation of these items can take time. Gradually, partners have shifted to a cash or voucher modality given that markets are accessible and it can reduce the logistical challenges with working in the two regions. Partners have reported though in struggling with targeting which can delay the ability of the affected population to delay the use of cash and vouchers in the immediate aftermath of an emergency when their needs are the most acute.

Since the start of the crisis, partners are also confronted with a number of lock-downs that Non-State Armed Groups call in order to protest against the government. Every Monday, within the Northwest and Southwest regions, is a lock-down day which has required some agencies to shift their working modality from Tuesday to Saturday, while other agencies work from home on Monday. All public holidays or major events involving losses by the Non-State Armed Groups or involving the Government of Cameroon usually result in lock-down days limiting the presence of humanitarian agencies in the field. Even if Non-State Armed Groups don't call a specific lock-down, the population stays at home and humanitarian agencies apply alternative work modalities out or precaution. The number of reduced days both in the office and in the field slow humanitarian responses.

Over time and with COVID-19 also limiting movements between 2020-21, the humanitarian community has gradually continued to lose protection by presence in the areas where the affected communities reside. This loss of humanitarian presence has been particularly devastating on shelter programming which requires agencies to be physically present at the shelter level. Security limitations have resulted in many humanitarian partners not being able to go beyond the distribution site to conduct good shelter programming at the shelter level. As the crisis has grown protracted, the need for more adequate shelter response options has grown, but partners are lacking both the human resources and the capacity to work at the household level. Partners' reliance on national NGOs to verify needs at the shelter level and to support in remote monitoring of shelter conditions is also augmented by the challenging security and logistical environment.



Identification of Hazards

The dynamics of the conflict and the number of natural resources makes the regions vulnerable to the following hazards that are both created by the conflict and also exacerbated by climate change.

Armed Conflict

- Non-international armed conflict

Internal Disturbances and Tensions

- Human Rights Violations
- Inter-communal violence
- Political Instability
- Civil Unrest

Economic Deterioration

- Significant price increases
- Significant income losses

Natural and Environmental Hazards

- Hydrometeorological Hazards: floods
- Geophysical Hazards: Volcanic Eruption, Landslides
- Biological Hazards: Epidemics
- Environmental Hazards: soil degradation, deforestation, loss of biodiversity, sea-level rise (SW, Littoral)



Ranking of Risks

Impact: Shelter Cluster's existing response capacities to respond to the predicted scenario and the projected additional people in need of humanitarian assistance based on the identified risk					
Likelihood - estimated probability that the scenario will occur in the next 12 to 24 months.	Insignificant Emergency Response Capacity of the Government is sufficient to cover the needs	Minor Shelter Cluster's response capacity is sufficient to cover the needs that the Government cannot meet	Moderate Up to 30% of additional resources are required to cover additional humanitarian needs	Major New resources (up to 31-79%) are needed to cover needs.	Disastrous New resources (Over 80%) are needed to respond to additional humanitarian needs
50-100% Very High	Low	Medium Civil Unrest Flooding	High Human Rights Violations Inter-Communal Conflict Economic Deterioration	High	High
31-50% High	Low	Medium	Medium Volcanic Eruption Wildfires	High	High
16-30% Medium	Low	Low Epidemic	Medium Landslides	Medium*	High Political Instability
6-15% Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium*	Medium Armed Conflict
0-5% Very Low	Low	Low	Low	Low	Medium

*Situation to watch closely, has the potential to become high risk.

Primary and Secondary Hazards

In terms of prioritization of response, it is good to recognize those hazards that have the likelihood to result in forced displacement and those hazards that may not necessarily cause forced displacement but can aggravate current conditions for those who are already displaced. Recognizing that the Cluster system was activated due to the dynamics of the conflict and directly to those dynamics that are resulting in forced displacement, it is necessary to remember that the first response priority has to to those who are impacted by the primary hazards, while working with the government to respond in situations of natural disasters.

Primary Hazards that can result in Forced Displacement	Secondary Hazards not necessarily resulting in forced displacement but could increase the likelihood of displacement and exacerbate impact
Human Rights Violations	Economic Deterioration- Loss of income and increase in prices
Inter-Communal Violence	Flooding
Political Instability	Volcanic Eruption
Armed Conflict	Wildfires

Human Rights Violations Contributing to Significant Displacement


HIGH

The conflict in the Northwest and Southwest Regions is typically characterized as “Internal Disturbances and Tensions” which include human rights violations. According to data collected by the Protection Cluster arbitrary arrest, property destruction, threat to life and personal security, abduction/kidnapping, and torture and inhuman treatment are the most commonly reported protection incidents from the crisis. These acts are perpetrated by both parties to the armed conflict. Throughout the crisis, estimates of fatalities vary with various sources claiming 4905 deaths¹ to 6000 deaths² throughout the 7 years of the conflict. It is difficult to determine the figure given that neither of the parties to the conflict publishes official figures on civilian casualties and verification is difficult. In addition to this is the fact that Cameroon has only conducted 3 census throughout the country’s history with the last one conducted in 2005. Without official statistics, the impact on the overall population is difficult to determine except for victim testimony about the impact the crisis has had on their communities. In addition to the number of people killed through these human rights violations, homes have been looted, burned, damaged, or destroyed as another tactic of the conflict. The precise number of homes damaged is not known as there was never any baseline started at the beginning of the crisis and due to limitations in access to verify damages and occupants in the aftermath of such events. According to household data collection of 13,500 households, 1% of these households were burnt intentionally, while 7% report that their homes were damaged accidentally throughout the course of the crisis. Given that Shelter Cluster partners do not have complete access to some of the most conflict affected locations in Boyo, Bui, Lebialem, Donga Mantung, Menchum, Kupe-Manenguba, Momo, Ndian, and Manyu Divisions, Shelter Cluster partners also asked IDPs what the state of their shelters was in their area of origin. 48% report that their shelters were destroyed, 40% report that their shelters were damaged, and 9% report that they don’t know the condition of their area of origin homes.³ These statistics are indicative of the need for housing over the next several years. Each time that there are human rights violations

1 Raleigh, C., Linke, A., Hegre, H., & Karlsen, J. (2010). “Introducing ACLED: An armed conflict location and event dataset: Special data feature”. Journal of Peace Research, 47(5), 651-660. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310378914>

2 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr17/6838/2023/en/>

3 <https://sheltercluster.org/north-west-south-west/pages/northwest-and-southwest-cameroon-crisis-coordinated-shelter-household>




Violence Against Civilians
(Source: ACLED Data Download 27th July 2023)

Human Rights Violations Contributing to Significant Displacement

or the fear of them, it results in displacements. As can be seen in analysing the trends of displacements since 2020, the number of people displaced has continued to decline as the crisis has grown more protracted, and populations tend to engage in pendular movements more often than staying in one displacement location. Nevertheless, there are frequent emergency situations that result in the displacement of IDPs requiring Shelter Cluster partners to be ready to respond. The more likely development of this scenario in the next two years would be that Non-State Armed Groups or Government Security Defense Forces conduct violence against civilians in one neighborhood that contributes to an escalation of emergency needs. This could happen at several neighborhoods at the same time or in one geographical neighborhood several times throughout the year. Shelter Cluster partners have noted the following thresholds that would trigger the implementation of the contingency plan:


- 600 displaced persons who can't immediately return from one neighborhood (the assumption of 10 neighborhoods impacted or 6000 people from 1000 households would trigger this plan.
- 10 houses burnt in one neighborhood
- 10 houses damaged in one neighborhood

IOM ETT # of Displaced and # of Pendular Movements




* Tracking of pendular displacement was introduced in the latter half of 2021, and displacement tracking since 20202

of Fatalities Caused by Armed Clashes and Violence Against Civilians
2017-23 (Source ACLED)



of Incidents Where Houses Have been
Burnt, Damaged, Destroyed, and Looted
per Region
Source: ACLED (2017-23)



Inter-Communal Conflict

Inter-communal conflict pre-dated the current crisis in the Northwest and Southwest regions. The chart on the left represents the involvement of various communal actors in the crisis and in inter-communal conflict. One of these ethnic groups is the Mbororo Fulani which is recognized as a marginalized indigenous group. Over the decades, the Mbororo-Fulani ethnic groups have developed close relationships with the government due to their historic marginalization and their need to seek legal mediation to protect their pastoral way of life.¹ Tensions between this pastoral group both in Cameroon and in Nigeria and local agriculturalists have increased as climate change and lack of sustainable agricultural practices² have decreased the lack of available productive land.³ In 2014, a study carried out by Village Aid and the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUA) found that in the Northwest Region, 75% of a surveyed 840 households had been involved in land conflicts in the previous three years.⁴ As the crisis has contributed to the decrease of the rule of law and the breakdown of judicial systems, land conflicts are often taking on an ethnic dimension. At the backdrop of the current crisis, there have been rumours of the government working with the Mbororo-Fulani and of the NSAGs engaging in hate speech against this ethnic group.⁵

At times in order to further destabilize the situation, NSAG factions have tried to exploit the linguistic element of the conflict to further stoke ethnic tensions. At several junctures of the conflict, NSAG elements have tried to generate rumours and hate speech against the French-speaking Bameleke people to try to encourage tensions between the Bameleke and Tikar grass-field English speaking populations. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of tensions between these two linguistic differing groups.

In terms of the likelihood of the development of this scenario over the next

1 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/06/cameroon-anglophone-mbororo-ethnic-clashes-history-religion/>

2 Communal Development Plans


3 Environmental Workshops [NW](#) and [SW](#)

4 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/267613833_IN_SEARCH_OF_COMMON_GROUND_FOR_FARMER-GRAZER_CONFLICTS_IN_THE_NORTH_WEST_REGION_OF_CAMEROON#pf2b

5 <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr17/6838/2023/en/>


HIGH

Ethnic Groups and Militias Involved in Conflict Incidents
NWSW Regions; Source: ACLED, # of Incidents



A local Cameroonian woman passes a thatch-roofed house made by refugees in Ako Subdivision, Donga Mantung Northwest Region, Cameroon @IMC December 2022

Inter-Communal Conflict



HIGH

two years, Shelter actors should be ready to respond to frequent conflict activity over access to land between these various ethnic groups. The map on the left illustrates locations where conflict activities have involved various ethnic groups during the last 6 years of the crisis. Shelter Cluster partners should be ready to respond to minor incidents at the neighbourhood level. At times these ethnic tensions can take on an international dimension as pastoralist groups from Nigeria also frequently move across borders in search of grazing lands which stokes tensions with local farmers. In the last 18 months the following cross border situations were recorded:

- March 2022: Authorities registered 7000 Nigerian refugees in Akwaya Subdivision, with other arrivals registered in Mamfe and Eyumojock.
- January 2023: Nigerian pastoralists clashed with NSAGs due to the fact that the NSAGs demanded a tax to graze in Menchum division which resulted in several deaths including that of civilians not involved in the conflict.
- April 2023: The kidnapping of locals in Ako Subdivision by Nigerian pastoralists.
- June 2023: Abduction of children and men in Ako Subdivision for ransom by Nigerian Fulani militia members.

One of the major challenges for Shelter Cluster partners in these responses is the lack of access to verify information and to launch a response. In the case of refugee influx, the Shelter Cluster would work closely with UNHCR through their refugee mandate to determine best ways to access the population and to confirm information to launch a response. The following thresholds that would trigger the implementation of the contingency plan:

- 600 displaced persons from one neighbourhood
- 10 houses burnt in one neighbourhood
- 10 houses damaged in one neighbourhood

Political Instability

HIGH with Disastrous Consequences

Currently the Constitution of Cameroon in Article 5 establishes the President of Cameroon as the symbol of National Unity. Article 6 of the Constitution point 4 states, *“Where the office of President of the Republic becomes vacant as a result of death, resignation or permanent incapacity duly ascertained by the Constitutional Council, the polls for the election of the new President of the Republic must be held not less than 20 (twenty) days and not more than 120 (one hundred and twenty) days after the office becomes vacant.”* During the absence of the President, the President of the Senate should assume powers, followed by the Vice President of the Senate if the former is not able to assume these powers.¹ The current president of Cameroon, Paul Biya, has currently been in power for 41 years. The last time he was re-elected was in 2018 during the same month that the clusters were activated in the Northwest and Southwest regions. The vote within the two regions was not peaceful, and after his re-election, the precaution was taken to deploy riot police on the streets of Yaoundé and Douala.² Earlier in Cameroon’s history in 2008, when Paul Biya announced an amendment to the constitution that would allow him to remove term limits for the office of the president from the constitution, protests against this move resulted in the killing of an estimated 100 protestors including in the major cities of Douala and Yaoundé.³

This scenario envisions that with the elections approaching in 2025, a power vacuum could be created that could contribute disorder amongst the Government Defence Forces of which the NSAGs would seek to exploit this power vacuum. Conflict could erupt elsewhere in the country, as certain regions could try to strengthen their grasp on power reigniting regional and ethnic tensions in other parts of the country. Given that the executive and the office of the presidency itself is the symbol of national unity, a power vacuum could ignite historical regional claims on the executive, as other parts of the country would like to see themselves represented in that high office. The number of incidents involving violent civil unrest could lead to an increase in forced displacement and instability. Armed conflict which currently has a low probability due to the dwindling resources of the NSAG and their frequent fragmentation could increase in likelihood due to the inability of the GSDF forces to maintain order and stability due to distractions elsewhere in the country.

This scenario envisions that not only would preparedness be required for Northwest and Southwest regions but also for the neighboring hosting regions of the West and Littoral Regions which could also see the political instability affecting their regions. Should this scenario realize itself, it would require more than 80% of the Shelter Cluster’s existing resources to respond. A financial ask of \$1.3 million dollars including the deployment of additional human resources and surge support would be required as this situation could have devastating consequences on the forced displacement situation in the country. The following triggers should signal that this situation was realized:


- 2600 households (15,600 people) displaced
- 30 homes damaged or burned in one location or neighborhood

1 The Constitution of Cameroon 1972 Revised English


2 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-45940414>

3 <https://web.archive.org/web/20110114025913/http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR17/001/2009/en/126d20cd-de59-11dd-b660-fb1f16ee4622/afr170012009en.pdf>

Income in the Previous 30 Days and Trend Lines
IDPs in Northwest and Southwest



Income in the Previous 30 Days and Trend Lines
Returnees in the Northwest and Southwest



Economic deterioration represented by a loss of income and also the increase in prices in the local markets has been evidenced by the Shelter Cluster in the form of household assessments (graphs on the left) and also through market monitoring of the items that are essential to conduct Shelter and NFI programming.¹ In addition to the decline in income caused by the ongoing crisis, markets throughout the four regions of displacement have been vulnerable to the activities in global markets including the fall out of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In addition to the rise in prices, suppliers have suffered from a shortage of fuel which has complicated the transportation of certain goods further increasing prices due to the cost that is required to sell certain items in the markets. As the complications in the global economy continue, Shelter Cluster partners will have to continually look at revising transfer values and the standard cost of kits to ensure that those affected by crisis receive humanitarian assistance adequate to their housing and basic needs. While not directly contributing to forced displacement, this hazard exacerbates the already poor conditions of those impacted by crisis. There are no triggers in this scenario, but it requires partners to continuously update the Cluster through the 5W and the price monitoring tools so that guidance during an emergency is up-to-date to facilitate an appropriate and adequate response.


¹ <https://sheltercluster.org/north-west-south-west/pages/northwest-and-southwest-came-roon-shelter-cluster-price-monitoring>

Armed Conflict Risk Scenario

MEDIUM


Currently, the crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions is not officially recognized as an Armed Conflict, even as a non-international armed conflict due to the fact that the intensity of the conflict has not reached a certain threshold and that the parties have not established a certain degree of organization. Non-State Armed Groups have continued to splinter into various groups due to constant political shifting and in-fighting for power and relevance. This creates increasingly the presence of new actors which further complicate humanitarian access.

Despite the NSAG's turn to increasingly sophisticated weaponry, it is unlikely that given the frequent loss of resources from the Diaspora for the NSAGs and their frequent fractionation that in the short-term the crisis would properly reach the nomination of non-international armed conflict. A sudden organization on the part of the NSAGs and political instability elsewhere in the country could be the only way that the reality of an Armed Conflict could come about. This risk is therefore ranked as being Medium and should be prepared for only if another risk of political instability is realized.



Civil Unrest

Incidents of Riots and Protests
2017-23



MEDIUM

The risk of civil unrest remains relatively low by looking at the trends during the last 6 years of the crisis in the four regions impacted by internal displacement. Protests and riots are relatively minor. The hazard of civil unrest should be seen as a catalyst for other types of hazards that can contribute to an escalation of forced displacement. It is notable that riots and protests are relatively more common in the Southwest and the West Region rather than in the Northwest and Littoral regions.

Peaceful protests from teachers and lawyers were one of the sparks by which NSAG forces started to escalate their armed attacks. It is notable that the recent displacement from Big Babanki started when elderly women were kidnapped for peacefully protesting the demand of a tax levied by NSAGs. Elections also can be incidents where protests can become violent and spark other hazards previously identified.

The hazard of civil unrest should be viewed as triggering other primary hazards.



Flooding risk is considered high throughout the 4 regions impacted by the crisis. The mountainous and hilly slopes in addition to poor construction practices on steep gradients have continued to exacerbate the risk that populations will be impacted by flooding. Poor drainage and lack of proper waste water management within towns and cities also accentuate flooding risks. The mountainous and volcanic slopes tend to be particularly critical accelerators of flood waters which can bring a destructive force to populations settled in the valleys of these areas. The following flooding incidents were recorded in the four regions in the last 18 months:

- Flash flooding in Bamenda in June 2022¹
- Landslides in Widikum in August 2022²
- Heavy rains and flooding in Mamfe that damaged 30 homes and left 100 people homeless
- Landslides and flooding in Buea that impacted 1000 people³
- Landslides and flooding in Limbe
- Flooding in Douala on several occasions

As flooding is a secondary hazard, it is important to remember the following criteria for intervening in flooding situations:

- The government should have the lead for natural disaster situations and humanitarian assistance should be aimed at supporting them in filling the gaps and providing complementary assistance.
- Priority assistance should be aimed at those IDPs, returnees, and conflict affected people who were already vulnerable to natural disaster because they have suffered from the crisis.
- Should do no harm by not enabling IDPs to build in no-build zones and avoiding other things that may put them at further risk of negative consequences.

¹ <https://mimimefoinfos.com/heavy-rains-in-bamenda-leave-two-persons-dead/>

² <https://floodlist.com/africa/cameroon-floods-august-2022#:~:text=Two%20young%20people%20died%20after,person%20died%20as%20a%20result.>

³ <https://sheltercluster.org/north-west-south-west/documents/buea-flood-shelter-cluster-mission-report-and-lessons-learned>

Legend

Status of Volcanoes	Subdivisions
STATUS	Surface Type
● Historical	ClassName
● Holocene	 Alkaline Intrusive
● Holocene?	 Volcanic
● Uncertain	 Extrusive Volcanic

The map displays the following features:

- Administrative Subdivisions:** Labeled regions include Furu-Awa, Misaje, Nkambe, Ndu, Nwa, Noni, Nkum, Mbven, Magba, Njimom, Fomban, Koutaba, Kouoptamo, Galim, Bafoussam 1er, Bafoussam 2e, Bafoussam 3e, Bafoussam 4e, Bafoussam 5e, Bafoussam 6e, Bafoussam 7e, Bafoussam 8e, Bafoussam 9e, Bafoussam 10e, Bafoussam 11e, Bafoussam 12e, Bafoussam 13e, Bafoussam 14e, Bafoussam 15e, Bafoussam 16e, Bafoussam 17e, Bafoussam 18e, Bafoussam 19e, Bafoussam 20e, Bafoussam 21e, Bafoussam 22e, Bafoussam 23e, Bafoussam 24e, Bafoussam 25e, Bafoussam 26e, Bafoussam 27e, Bafoussam 28e, Bafoussam 29e, Bafoussam 30e, Bafoussam 31e, Bafoussam 32e, Bafoussam 33e, Bafoussam 34e, Bafoussam 35e, Bafoussam 36e, Bafoussam 37e, Bafoussam 38e, Bafoussam 39e, Bafoussam 40e, Bafoussam 41e, Bafoussam 42e, Bafoussam 43e, Bafoussam 44e, Bafoussam 45e, Bafoussam 46e, Bafoussam 47e, Bafoussam 48e, Bafoussam 49e, Bafoussam 50e, Bafoussam 51e, Bafoussam 52e, Bafoussam 53e, Bafoussam 54e, Bafoussam 55e, Bafoussam 56e, Bafoussam 57e, Bafoussam 58e, Bafoussam 59e, Bafoussam 60e, Bafoussam 61e, Bafoussam 62e, Bafoussam 63e, Bafoussam 64e, Bafoussam 65e, Bafoussam 66e, Bafoussam 67e, Bafoussam 68e, Bafoussam 69e, Bafoussam 70e, Bafoussam 71e, Bafoussam 72e, Bafoussam 73e, Bafoussam 74e, Bafoussam 75e, Bafoussam 76e, Bafoussam 77e, Bafoussam 78e, Bafoussam 79e, Bafoussam 80e, Bafoussam 81e, Bafoussam 82e, Bafoussam 83e, Bafoussam 84e, Bafoussam 85e, Bafoussam 86e, Bafoussam 87e, Bafoussam 88e, Bafoussam 89e, Bafoussam 90e, Bafoussam 91e, Bafoussam 92e, Bafoussam 93e, Bafoussam 94e, Bafoussam 95e, Bafoussam 96e, Bafoussam 97e, Bafoussam 98e, Bafoussam 99e, Bafoussam 100e.
- Volcanic Status:** Indicated by colored dots: red for historical, green for holocene, cyan for holocene?, and blue for uncertain.
- Surface Types:** Indicated by background shading: yellow for alkaline intrusive, orange for volcanic, and light coral for extrusive volcanic.
- Geographical Features:** Rivers like the Cross River, Cameroonian River, and Littoral are shown. The city of Yaoundé is highlighted as the capital.
- Scale and Coordinates:** A scale bar shows distances up to 48 kilometers. Latitude and longitude coordinates are provided at the bottom corners.


In addition to being impacted by crisis, parts of the Southwest, Littoral, West, and Northwest Regions are part of the Cameroonian Line of volcanoes. The most active volcano is Cameroon's highest mountain, Mount Cameroon which is accessible through the town of Buea and also covers several villages in Muyuka and Mbonge Subdivisions. Mount Cameroon last erupted on the 3rd February 2012. Previous eruptions occurred in the years of 2001, 2000, 1999 and in other years have produced earthquakes, lahar incidents, and lava flows. The flooding and landslides in Buea in March 2023 have been attributed to some as minor lahar incident, but many have determined that the landslides were released by the force of the water and not any volcanic activity.

In the Oku Volcanic Field in the NW Region, in 1986 there was the Lake Nyos disaster which resulted in over 1700 deaths due to the release of poisonous carbon dioxide to those living around Lake Nyos. It is not clear if it was an eruption or landslide that resulted in the release of these gasses.

Think Hazards put the risk of an eruption in the Southwest and Littoral as High and for the Northwest and West regions as very low. This is due to the fact that the volcanoes in the Oku Volcanic Field are largely considered to be inactive. This estimate of Think Hazards highlights that if there were to be an eruption of the Mount Cameroon, that Fako, Ndiang, and Meme Divisions could be heavily impacted.

This scenario would require working in cooperation with the government authorities to support their assistance to those impacted by the eruption and to provide assistance to those already impacted by the crisis. Some of the solutions to housing damage in this scenario would require longer-term solutions such as reconstruction of mudbrick or wooden houses (actually semi-permanent structures) in addition to provision of life-saving NFIs that may have been damaged as a result of the eruption.

Landslide




MEDIUM

As is illustrated in the map on the lefthand side of the page, the risks of landslides are the most acute in mountainous volcanic areas in addition to locations known to have steep slopes. The Shelter Cluster has identified that a common pattern of internally displaced people is to build in areas that the authorities have determined to be no-build zones. These are areas that are less than 5 m besides waterways and roads. Despite this clear communication, these areas are not commonly marked and there is lack of clear enforcement of regulation to prevent building in these areas. These high slope at risk areas are often more affordable for construction and hence why a number of internally displaced people end up living in this area.

Flooding and lack of proper wastewater management heighten the risk of landslides and make these houses vulnerable to natural disasters. As noted above in the flooding section, landslides have been reported to occur throughout the Northwest and Southwest but are not always in accessible locations for a humanitarian response. In terms of longer-term programming, it is recommended that Shelter Cluster partners create longer-term development programming in coordination with the Ministry of Habitat and Urban Development to create awareness among IDPs and returnees about the risks of building in these no-build zones. Similarly, local authorities are always warning about evacuation or engaging in demolitions in the aftermath of disasters, but often people don't have a better alternative for housing at this stage. Preparedness requires sensitizing the population to know not to build in these areas and also of putting in place alternative better housing before natural disasters before they occur.

Wildfire




MEDIUM

MEDIUM

The risk of wildfires is illustrated in the map on the left produced from data produced from the Global Facility for Disaster Risk Reduction. The risk of wildfires is higher in areas that have more dense vegetation. In addition to wildfires are also human's interaction with the surrounding vegetation. If supporting the population with access to cooking fuel, it is important to ensure that the population is not cooking in proximity to forested areas and to other shelters. Fires are one of the direct causes of homelessness for the population and can be secondary hazards that exacerbate the housing conditions of those already displaced. The presence and risk of wildfire should be considered in its contributions to deteriorating circumstances for other hazards.


Estimated Scope of Residential Buildings that are found in “Risk Zones”

Estimated Number of Residential Buildings Built within 5M from a Roadway



Estimated Number of Residential Buildings Built within 5M from a Waterway

Disclaimer: This map is probably less accurate given the lack of access to a high quality Digital Elevation Model covering the four regions. The model probably underestimates drainage and natural erosion over time.



List of Minimum Preparedness Actions

Given the protracted nature of the crisis, the Shelter Cluster recommends that the following preparedness actions are taken by Shelter Cluster partners in to improve agencies readiness for the response.

1. Ensure that Shelter Cluster partners are all trained and familiar with the [Shelter Cluster Standard Household Needs assessment tool](#). During previous emergency situations, the first challenge is to identify the number of affected persons. Often this has been difficult to determine as this data is confused with data of people in the same area who have been protractedly displaced or affected by other elements of the conflict and not directly impacted by the emergency situation. The Shelter Cluster's household tool provides the ability to verify needs at the household level and to have a better idea of the scope of the issue. It is important that Shelter Cluster partners use this tool to avoid several partners conducting different assessments and thus fatiguing the population and delaying assistance. The use of the same tool will enable all Cluster partners to have a clear understanding of what are the needs of the population. In order to organize the data collection, Shelter Cluster partners should agree by discussing with the Cluster team and other cluster partners their intention to collect data and if necessary jointly divide the work to ensure that a significant number of the population is sampled to best determine the needs. As in the Buea floods, the Shelter Cluster can come up with a geographical sampling plan and divide that amongst partner agencies. The household tool has been adapted for flooding and landslide situations during the incidents in 2023 in [Buea](#) and in [Limbe](#).
2. Conduct **Rental Market Monitoring** to identify the availability and condition of buildings that IDPs are renting. To support understanding both on the demand side and the supply side, the Norwegian Refugee Council has developed two market monitoring tools that the Shelter Cluster has adapted to support partners in better understanding the dynamics of the rental market. In order to map available accommodation, the [Shelter Cluster recommends partners to use the supply form](#), and to understand [current dynamics within the IDP or Returnee Rental market, the demand side form can support in understanding the various segments of the rental market including for type of housing, location, formal, and informal markets](#).
3. Conduct **price monitoring** of the various items that form the items needed for improving shelter and living conditions. The Shelter Cluster has created a [price monitoring tool to better map the maximum, minimum, average, and current prices of the various items in the standard NFI kits and the materials that may be needed for improving and repairing one's shelter](#). These are actions that cluster partners can do to ensure that the standard guidance is up to date prior to the occurrence of an emergency situation.
4. Cluster partners to work on a **unified list of vendors by market** who are able to supply the market with sufficient and quality items should a disaster break out. This list could help the Cluster partners to jointly and efficiently use cash and vouchers as a modality in the case of new displacement situations.
5. One of the challenges with repair activities in the Northwest and Southwest was the loss of skilled labour to conduct repairs and construction activities caused by the crisis. In order to save time in advance of emergencies, Shelter Cluster partners involved in repair activities could also compile a list of skilled labourers who would be able to respond in such a situation. This could be done in collaboration with livelihood actors as part of **labour market monitoring**.
6. **Pre-positioning of materials:** Currently, in emergency situations, partners still have more capacity to deliver items in-kind to quickly respond and start supporting those in need. It is important to remember that NFI kits are useful for providing immediate relief for temporary sleeping conditions and for preparing and storing food, while emergency shelter kits can improve partitioning and cover openings in roofs for a 6 month

to 1 year time maximum. Over the next few years, it will be important for the Cluster to know which agencies have a contingency stock to respond quickly in the case of the contingency plan being triggered.

- 7. Mapping out available beds in case of emergency situations:** While Collective Centres are not all that common throughout the four regions of displacement¹, it is important to map out available sleeping areas for both temporary shelter and also for ensuring that these centres have enough NFIs and bedding materials in the case of emergency. Schools, government buildings, and health centres have often served as temporary shelters for both protracted and temporarily displaced people but lack adequate sleeping space for the affected population. Monitoring of these spaces in addition to the provision of mattresses and sleeping materials in advance of a displacement could enhance preparedness of these locations to provide accommodation until other suitable accommodation is found or IDPs can willingly and safely return.
- 8. Improved monitoring of indicators that will be used to activate the contingency plan:** Currently, updates on displacements are reported through IOM's Emergency Tracking Tool. Updates are sent on a weekly basis and in the case of significant displacements more often than that. It is recommended that IOM start publishing a quarterly trends report, so that changes in displacement could be monitored over time. In the area of tracking damages, the Shelter Cluster has significant challenges to verify these reports in the field due to the access challenges. Most reports are coming through protection monitoring and security monitoring which receive these reports second hand. In order to verify occupancy of damaged shelters and the humanitarian nature of the shelter damage, it will be important to verify information through the Shelter Cluster household tool which is the only tool that looks at the situation at the shelter level.

Implementation and Ideal Timeline for Activities

The time line to respond in case of the triggering of this response plan will be the following:

1. Within 1 or 2 weeks of the emergency:

- Monitoring and Verification of Needs using the Shelter Cluster Household Tool including analysis of severities.
- Distribution of NFI kits in-kind for the displaced
- Distribution of NFI items that are not in agency traditional kits: mattresses principally
- Distribution of emergency shelter kits for those who have damaged roofing and those in need of partitioning walls
- If cash or voucher programming planned, ensure market monitoring data is up-to-date and agreements with vendors in place.
- Ensure rental market monitoring is accurate of the current situation within the rental market

2. 3 weeks to 3 months depending on the ability of IDPs to return and their intentions

- Cash for Rent support for IDPs in overcrowded accommodation and for those already renting who are struggling to afford rent
- Cash/Voucher for NFIs or shelter construction materials
- Support to IDPs and returnees on making their shelters more habitable through technical assistance with verification that they are allowed to do any modifications or improvements on the shelter.

3. 3 weeks or whenever security situation allows:

- Repairs of those still living left behind in damaged shelters or for those displaced nearby who have the intention to move back in as soon as the shelter is repaired.

4. Coordination Arrangements:

- The Shelter Cluster team will typically contact partners that have reported recent activities in the 5W within the Subdivision of the emergency event, but in some cases if those first contacted don't respond, the Shelter Cluster team can reach out to all cluster partners operational within that Region. Similarly, not all Cluster partners have the capacity to respond in Shelter which requires an intervention from a more limited pool of partners.
- Shelter Cluster partners intending to respond or conduct an assessment should contact the Shelter Cluster team immediately. Shelter Cluster partners who do not contact the Cluster team first run the risk that their activities could be stopped due to lack of coordination. The risk of non-duplication comes through sharing the data with the Cluster team and also in taking the advice of the Cluster team to exchange beneficiary lists with all partners involved in responding to that response.

Stock Report and Estimated Budget to increase pre-positioning of items for scenarios described

Item	# of Items	Location	Type of Item	Gap in Items to Respond to High Impact Emergencies (1000 Households)	Gap in Items to Respond to Disastrous Emergencies (2600 Households)	Estimated Unit Price of Item	Budget Needed to restock for worst case scenario
Tarpaulins	1256	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	-744	-3944	\$15.00 for 2 Tarpaulins	\$59,580
Rope- Non Descript	628	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	None	None	0	0
ROPE, NYLON, UV RESISTANT	2450	Douala	UN STOCK				0
HOE, HEAD	1000	Douala	UN STOCK	None	1600	\$5.50	\$8800
PICK AXE	1000	Douala	UN STOCK	None	1600	\$3.50	\$5600
SHOVEL	1000	Douala	UN STOCK	None	1600	\$6.00	\$9600
NAILS,100MM	3705	Douala	UN STOCK	None	None	0	0
Blankets	1256	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	None	-1664	\$10 for 2	\$17,000
BLANKET, SYNTHETIC (FLEECE) 1.5 x 2 m, MEDIUM THERMAL	2281	Douala	UN STOCK				
Mosquito Nets	1256	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	-744	-3944	\$17 for 2	\$67,048
Sleeping Mats	1256	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	None	None	0	0
Synthetic Sleeping Mats	5278	Douala	UN STOCK			0	0

Kitchen Sets (5 soup spoons, 1 serving spoon, 2 cast iron pots, 1 kitchen knife, 5 table forks, 1 jar)	628	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	None	None	0	0
KITCHEN SET, TYPE B, STAINLESS STEEL	3212	Douala	UN STOCK				
Solar Lamps	628	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	None	-1260	\$12.00	\$15,120
SOLAR LAMP, PORTABLE, LED	712	Douala	UN STOCK				
Plastic Bucket	628	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	None	-403	\$9.50	\$3828.50
BUCKET,HEAVY DUTY PLASTIC,14L	1565	Douala	UN STOCK				
Jerry Cans	1256	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	None	-470	\$12.50 for 2	\$5875
JERRYCAN,SEMI-COLLAPSIBLE,10 L – TYPE B	3485	Douala	UN STOCK				
Plastic Basic	628	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	-372	-1972	\$5	\$9860
Laundry Soap	1884 pcs	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	-4116	-13,716	\$5 for 6 per HH	\$68,580
Bathing Soap	3140 pcs	Caritas Kumba and SHUMAS Bamenda	UN Project Based	-2860	-12,460	\$5 for 6 per HH	\$62,300

Assumptions about Cluster Current Funding and Projection of Funding Needed To Respond to New Scenarios

Based on data reported by Shelter Cluster partners through the [5W as of June 2023](#), the Shelter Cluster has [estimated its current founding level and projected the level of funding that would be required for Shelter Cluster partners to scale up their repsonses](#). This methodology relies on activity based costing from the Shelter Cluster's guidance and what partners report as the standard transfer value per activity. The table below describes the assumptions behind this bugeting:

Activity	Current Overall Funding Level- all prices are rounded up	Budget Needed to Respond to High Impact Emergencies Additional 30% to Existing Budget	Budget Needed to Respond to Disastrous Impact Emergencies Additional 80% to Existing Resources
NFI Assistance	\$394,000	\$118,200	\$320,000
Emergency Shelter Kit Provision	\$380,000	\$114,000	\$305,000
Rental Assistance 3-6 Months	\$400,000	\$120,000	\$320,000
Shelter Repairs	\$90,000	\$27,000	\$72,000
Overhead Costs 7%	\$88,500	\$26,600	\$17,700
Staffing Costs 23%	\$291,000	\$87,300	\$58,200
Total	\$1,643,500	\$493,100 (rounded up to \$500,000 to ac- count for the fact that is an eti- mation based on activity-based estimates)	\$1,092,900